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Abstract  
Campaign advisors and political scientists have long acknowledged the benefits of 
ambiguous position-taking. We argue, however, that these benefits do not extend to black 
candidates facing non-black voters. When a white candidate makes vague statements, many of 
these voters project their own policy positions onto the candidate, increasing support for the 
candidate. But they are less likely to extend black candidates the same courtesy. We test these 
claims with an original two-wave survey experiment varying the race of male candidates on a 
national sample of non-black voters. We find that ambiguity boosts support for white male 
candidates but not for black male candidates. In fact, black male candidates who make 
ambiguous statements are actually punished for doing so by racially prejudiced voters. These 
results clarify limits on the utility of the electoral strategy of ambiguity and identify a key 
condition under which prejudice shapes voter behavior. 
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In many competitive campaigns for public office, candidates take ambiguous positions on 
issues.  Scholars have identified many instances in which ambiguity is an effective strategy for 
candidates (Campbell 1983a, 1983b; Chappell 1994; Page 1976; Tomz and Van Houweling 
2009b).  In turn, when it comes to salient issues, candidates often determine that ambiguity gives 
them the best chance of winning (Milita, et al. 2014).  One reason for the effectiveness of 
ambiguity is policy projection: when a candidate makes ambiguous statements, in many cases 
voters assume the candidate’s position is the same as their own (Somer-Topcu 2015).  
 To date, much of the scholarship on ambiguous position-taking implicitly assumes that 
voters have few pre-existing predispositions toward the candidates other than partisanship and 
knowledge of their incumbency.  This is a limiting assumption.  Decades of scholarly work 
illuminate candidate characteristics that alter the relationship between voter and candidate even 
when both are members of the same party.  As a result, a campaign tactic that helps one 
candidate may prove ineffective for a candidate with different traits.   
One characteristic that has emerged as particularly important in the relationship between 
voter and candidate is race.  White voters, for example, are often hesitant to support black 
candidates (e.g., Tesler and Sears 2010).  If a key advantage of ambiguity lies in the fact that it 
leads voters to give candidates the benefit of the doubt (Jensen 2009), then a candidate’s race 
may condition the extent to which voters are willing to extend the candidate this courtesy. 
We argue that candidate race acts as a constraint on the effectiveness of ambiguity. While 
white candidates are rewarded for making ambiguous statements, the benefits of ambiguity do 
not extend to black candidates who are evaluated by non-black voters.  Rather, when black 
candidates make vague issue claims, these voters are less likely to give black candidates the 
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benefit of the doubt.  That is, voters do not project their own policy positions onto ambiguous 
black candidates the way they do with ambiguous white candidates.  
We test these claims using a two-wave survey experiment with a national sample of non-
black adults and replicate these findings with an additional study.  The main experiment 
manipulates the race of a male candidate (white or black) and the type of statement made about 
the environment (ambiguous, precise, or silent – in which the candidate says nothing on the 
issue).  Our study identifies both the effect of ambiguity on candidate evaluations and a key 
reason for this effect: voters projecting their policy positions onto candidates.  This is an 
important methodological innovation: many have theorized that policy projection is key to the 
benefits of ambiguity, but this has rarely been empirically tested (but see Somer-Topcu 2015).  
We find that the white male candidate is most popular after taking an ambiguous issue 
position, consistent with existing scholarship.  The black male candidate, in contrast, gains no 
such boost from ambiguity.  Indeed, for a key subset of respondents, ambiguity backfires: 
racially prejudiced voters actually rate the black male candidate less favorably when he uses 
ambiguous rhetoric than when he uses precise rhetoric or avoids the issue entirely.  
Although there is a great deal of research on candidate communication and a great deal of 
research on candidate race, there is a need for research connecting both.  As McGraw (2003) 
writes, “ …a complete understanding of what ordinary citizens think about politicians will be out 
of reach until [scholars] take into account the strategic interplay between elites and the mass 
public” (395).  We work to bridge this gap by jointly studying candidate race and candidate 
rhetoric.  Extending Page’s (1976) observations that “[t]he most striking feature of candidates’ 
rhetoric about policy is its extreme vagueness,” we note that while ambiguous rhetoric is a 
constant in the electoral environment, public responses to it vary by virtue of a candidate’s race. 
 
 
3 
Speaking Ambiguously about the Issues 
 When candidates speak, they want to emphasize issues that the voters will find pleasing 
(Vavreck 2009).  Candidates accomplish this by discussing those issues that the public associates 
with the candidate’s party (Petrocik 1996) or by crafting specific messages to narrow audiences 
(Hillygus and Shields 2008).  However, campaigns cannot guarantee that their messages will be 
pleasing to the intended audience.  The risk of a mismatch between message and audience and 
the punishment that comes with this mismatch is so great that in many cases ambiguous language 
is preferable even with micro-targeted messages (Hersh and Schaffner 2013). 
 One reason ambiguous statements can appeal to voters is “projection.”  Because 
ambiguous stances lack policy details, voters are free to assume that a candidate’s specific policy 
position matches their own (see Krosnick 2002 for a review).  For example, Somer-Topcu (2015) 
finds that when political parties market themselves broadly, many voters perceive that their own 
positions align with those of the party.  Hence, a party that makes broad, imprecise appeals may 
find that voters on both the left and the right believe the party shares their views, regardless of 
the actual positions of the party’s elites.  
Voters may be especially likely to project their policy positions onto a candidate if they 
are otherwise predisposed to like the candidate.  In a formal model, Jensen (2009) shows that a 
candidate who takes an ambiguous position can beat a candidate who takes the position of the 
median voter if the ambiguous candidate has a valence advantage.  In such a case, voters will 
resolve the uncertainty by assuming the ambiguous candidate’s position is closer to their own.  
Ambiguity and Candidate Race  
 Ambiguity is often beneficial in part because it opens up room for voters to project their 
own policy positions onto a candidate.  Yet this strategy is most likely to be successful when 
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voters already have a positive predisposition toward the candidate.  But if voters are predisposed 
to dislike a candidate, this positive projection may never occur.  Tomz and Van Houweling 
(2009b), for example, do not find that candidates from an opposing party are rewarded for 
ambiguity (see also Brady and Sniderman 1985).  Simply put, then, in the absence of a valence 
advantage, a candidate is unlikely to benefit from taking ambiguous issue positions.  
There are many reasons why a voter may initially lack positive affect toward a candidate.  
One obvious reason is party, as noted in the Tomz and Van Houweling (2009b) findings above. 
Another powerful candidate characteristic that may have implications for affect, candidate race, 
is independent of partisanship.  That is, candidate race may lead some groups of voters to dislike 
even a candidate who is a member of their own party (Krupnikov and Piston 2015b).   
 Indeed, scholars have uncovered a number of key instances in which non-black voters 
have reacted negatively to black candidates (Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Krupnikov, Piston, and 
Bauer 2016; Lupia et al. 2015; Reeves 1997; Weaver 2012), most notably in the 2008 
presidential election (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Hutchings 2009; Kalmoe and Piston 2013; 
Tesler and Sears 2010).  Moreover, research suggests that black candidates are 
disproportionately punished for questionable behavior such as becoming involved in scandals 
(Berinsky et al. 2011).  Furthermore, there is reason to believe black candidates may be more 
limited than white candidates in the types of campaign techniques they can successfully employ.  
Black candidates, for example, are more likely to be punished by white voters for sponsoring 
negative advertisements (Krupnikov and Piston 2015a).  
The fact that non-black voters treat white candidates differently from black candidates 
suggests that they may respond differently to ambiguous appeals as well.  In particular, candidate 
race may hinder the process of projection.  If ambiguity is most likely to trigger projection when 
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a voter is already positively predisposed to a candidate, then white voters may be less likely to 
project their own position onto an ambiguous black candidate than on an ambiguous white 
candidate.  Ambiguous rhetoric offers few clues to a candidate’s true stance, leaving voters with 
significant leeway.  The benefit of ambiguity depends on voters giving the candidate the benefit 
of the doubt, something that many voters facing a black candidate may be less likely to do.  
 An important reason why a voter may not extend the benefit of the doubt to a black 
candidate who uses ambiguity is antipathy.  Indeed, ambiguous statements are a type of political 
rhetoric that is especially likely to stimulate subtle forms of racial discrimination (Pettigrew and 
Meertens 1995).  While overt racial discrimination consists of people directly and openly 
opposing black people as a result of their race, subtle forms of discrimination rest in the way 
individuals interpret the information they receive about black people and their subsequent 
evaluation of this information.  This type of subtle racial animosity often manifests itself in 
people being less charitable to blacks in evaluating interactions that are not clear-cut and are 
open to interpretation (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Dovidio and Gaertner 2000).  Indeed, even 
people who claim to be racially egalitarian in their worldview may be less charitable in their 
interpretation of ambiguous interactions when these interactions involve members of racial 
minority groups (Dovidio and Gaertner 2000).  In the context of a campaign for public office, 
since the benefit of ambiguous rhetoric depends on voters interpreting the statement in a positive 
way, black candidates may be less likely than white candidates to gain the benefit of ambiguity 
even among voters who outwardly appear to hold no racial prejudice.    
 These theoretic points lead us to our initial set of observable implications.  First, we 
expect that white candidates receive a boost from taking ambiguous positions while black 
candidates will not.  It is important to note that the difference in favorability we expect to 
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observe will result from a boost for the white candidate in the presence of ambiguity, rather than 
a punishment for the black candidate.  Second, policy projection should underscore this effect.  
That is, ambiguous rhetoric will increase the likelihood that individuals will project their 
positions onto white candidates, but no such effect will be observed for black candidates.  
These first two predictions focus on the intersection of candidate race and ambiguous 
rhetoric, suggesting that white candidates facing non-black voters have more to gain from 
ambiguity than black candidates do.  We also turn to a source of individual-level heterogeneity 
that may condition voter responses to black candidates’ ambiguity: racial prejudice.  Ambiguous 
rhetoric makes it more difficult for voters to make candidate selections based on issues; when 
issue positions are unclear, other factors become more important in the evaluation process 
(Groseclose 2001).  Put differently, ambiguous rhetoric shrinks the perceived policy distance 
between the two candidates, increasing the likelihood that voters select candidates based on an 
attribute other than the candidates’ policy positions, such as candidate race. 
A black candidate who uses ambiguous rhetoric may therefore make his or her race more 
salient to voters.  Among those who are racially prejudiced, therefore, ambiguous rhetoric may 
actually cost a black candidate votes.1  This intersection of prejudice, candidate race and 
ambiguous rhetoric leads to our final observable implication.  We expect that individuals who 
are high in racial prejudice are less likely to vote for a black candidate when the candidate uses 
ambiguous rhetoric than when the black candidate is clear or remains silent on an issue.  
Research Design 
																																								 																				
1 Hassell and Visalvanich (2015) use a similar logic to explain why whites will fail to act in 
support of non-racial policies when they believe that minorities may benefit from the policies. 
 
 
7 
 We test our theoretical expectations using an experiment; these results are then replicated 
on a separate experimental study in a different political context and using a different recruitment 
approach to ensure robustness (McDermott 2011).  Our approach builds on a foundation of 
research that suggests that experiments are the strongest method of determining how voters 
respond to ambiguous statements (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009a).  
Experimental Subjects: Our main experiment relies on a national sample of subjects recruited 
using Survey Sampling International (SSI), an Internet survey company commonly used in 
political science research (e.g., Kam 2012; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013).2  
Our study (details, question wording, and stimuli in Web Appendix 1) was conducted in 
two waves so as to avoid contamination between measures of participant predispositions and the 
treatments themselves.  This is particularly important for two reasons.  First, the two-wave 
structure allows us to separate the measures of racial attitudes from measures of responses to 
candidates from different racial groups. Second, this design allows us to analyze whether policy 
projection occurs without contaminating responses to the treatments.  
In the first wave of the study, participants were asked a series of questions to measure 
their positions on various political issues including the environment (the central issue of this 
study), their racial attitudes, and their demographic characteristics.  The second wave of the 
study took place two weeks later; it included both the random assignment to experimental 
condition and the post-treatment measures, including evaluations of the candidates. The 
responses of 526 non-black participants who completed both waves of the study are analyzed.  
																																								 																				
2 SSI maintains a panel of participants recruited through various Internet sources including ads, 
social network website and other online communities (see Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014).  
Characteristics of the sample are shown in Web Appendix 3.  
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 It is important to note that the two waves were designed to appear as separate studies to 
the participants.  There was nothing in wave 1 to suggest that the study would have a 
continuation, and participants were invited to take part in wave 2 in the same way that they 
would be invited to take part in any new study.  Given the design of SSI study invitation, there 
would have been no way for the participants to link the two studies.  As a result, there is little 
likelihood that a participant could have deliberately opted out of wave 2 of the study based on his 
or her experiences with wave 1.  
Experimental Design: In the second wave of this study subjects are asked to choose between two 
fictional male candidates: the Democrat, Sam Larson, and the Republican, Tom McCann.  
Subjects are told these individuals are two “potential candidates for Congress.” On the screen, 
the subjects see statements from the candidates as well as the candidates’ pictures (see Web 
Appendix 1).  The photographs used in this study were validated in previous studies to ensure 
that the candidates were perceived to differ with respect to racial characteristics but not with 
respect to other relevant characteristics (i.e, attractiveness, competence).  The results of these 
pre-tests are discussed in Web Appendix 2. 
The experiment uses a 2 X 3 design.  The first dimension is the candidate’s race.  
Subjects view a photo of the Democratic candidate, Sam Larson, and they are randomly assigned 
to see a version of this photo in which he is either white or black.3  Larson’s Republican 
																																								 																				
3 Most black candidates seeking office run as Democrats rather than Republicans (Hood and 
McKee 2015). Given these patterns and resource limitations, we focus on black Democratic 
candidates as they may be more familiar to our participants. Some research suggests that white 
voters are more responsive to black Republicans who run, though these Republicans also face 
electoral limitations (Karpowitz, et al. 2015; Rigueur 2015).  
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opponent, McCann, is white in all conditions, presenting a constant comparison point.4  Our 
decision to include a partisan cue is an important one: as Weaver (2012) points out, experimental 
studies of candidate race routinely avoid including party labels “because of their potential to 
“swamp” the results” (171).  This approach therefore results in a difficult test of our hypotheses 
about the differential effects of ambiguity across candidate race.5   
The second dimension is Larson’s statement about an environmental issue.  While in all 
conditions Larson makes a series of identical statements (e.g., indicating positions on small 
business and on teacher salaries), his position on the environment, embedded within these policy 
statements, is experimentally manipulated.  
We choose the environment as an issue following previous research suggesting that white 
voters believe that race is not salient to environmental issues (Reeves 1997).  Of course, we do 
not intend to suggest that race plays no role in environmental policy.  Much scholarship 
demonstrates that race is pivotal to understanding differences in environmental conditions across 
																																								 																				
4 Our analysis focuses on contests in which Black candidates “must depend on racially tolerant 
whites to win” (Smooth 2010; 177). In these types of contests, most elections include a black 
candidate facing off against a white candidate, as an election with two black candidates is most 
likely to occur in majority-minority districts (Bositis 2012). If ambiguity is most likely to be 
utilized when candidates face electorates with “heterogeneous policy preferences” (Tomz and 
Van Houweling 2009, 97), this may be more likely to occur in districts where black candidates 
must rely on white voters to secure a victory.  
5	A limitation is that we rely only on male candidates, meaning our results extend most closely to 
men.  There is research suggesting that under some conditions women who run for office are 
treated differently (Lawless 2004), although others critique this argument (e.g., Dolan 2014).	
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the country (Simpson 2015; Mohai and Saha 2007; Pastor, et al 2001; Stretesky and Hogan 
1998), where “people of color and low income persons have borne greater environmental and 
health risks” (Bullard 1999, 7).  Despite these racial disparities, however, white voters who are 
privileged by racial disparities rarely connect race to environmental issues (Pulido 2000).  This 
failure of white voters to understand the importance of race to environmental issues is important 
for our study. We can consider whether racially prejudiced white voters punish black candidates 
for ambiguity even on issues that they believe have little connection to race.  
In the Ambiguous condition, Larson makes a broad valence statement lacking any 
specific policy information.  Larson says, “Like many Americans, I am proud of America’s 
natural beauty.”  Consistent with real-world political rhetoric, this statement conveys nothing 
about Larson’s stance on environmental policy.  We designed this statement to follow Milita, et 
al.’s (2014) description of a common type of ambiguous rhetoric in existing campaigns: 
mentioning a generally agreed upon value while providing no indication of one’s policy position. 
The Ambiguous condition is compared to two baseline conditions.  The first of these is 
the Silent condition, in which Larson makes no reference to the environment.  The second is the 
Precise condition, where Larson says, “We need to increase the fines on companies that pollute 
our air and water.”  In this condition, Larson takes a clear stance on environmental policy. This 
approach allows us to assess the effects of ambiguous rhetoric relative to two alternative 
approaches: avoiding the issue and taking a specific policy position.6  
																																								 																				
6 As a check for randomization balance, we use our first wave measures to conduct a 
randomization check that models assignment to treatment as a function of racial attitudes, race, 
partisanship, ideology, opinions on the environment, gender, education, income and news 
attention. We find that these factors do not predict assignment to treatment.  
 
 
11 
Candidate Evaluation Measures: Following exposure to the experimental stimulus, subjects were 
asked a series of questions to measure their evaluations of the two candidates.  The first measure 
of preference was a question that asked, “Which of the two candidates above do you prefer?”  
The response options are Sam Larson, Tom McCann or “I do not like either candidate.”  This 
third option is important because previous studies have shown that ambiguity can affect not only 
candidate selection but also the decision to abstain rather than choose a candidate (Krupnikov 
and Ryan 2014).  For our purposes, the relevant choice is whether or not voters will support 
Larson, since it is only Larson who varies with respect to ambiguity and candidate race.  Hence, 
our first measure of candidate preference is a variable coded “1” if the subject chooses Larson 
and “0” if the subject chooses either McCann or neither candidate.  
 Next, a second post-treatment measure asked subjects to rate the two candidates from 0 to 
100 on feeling thermometers.  We use these to construct an alternative dependent variable: the 
difference between the feeling thermometer rating of Larson (the target candidate) and McCann 
(Krupnikov 2012).  Positive values indicate the subject prefers Larson to McCann while negative 
values indicate that the subject prefers McCann to Larson.  This scale is converted to a 0 to 1 
scale, where values greater than 0.5 indicate that the respondent feels warmer toward Larson than 
McCann and values less than 0.5 indicate the reverse. 
Racial Prejudice Measures: Our argument suggests that the effect of ambiguity will be 
conditioned by racial prejudice.  We measure racial prejudice in the first wave of the study using 
a Stereotype Index.  The index here is identical to that used in previous research (e.g., Hutchings 
2009; Piston 2010): a battery of two questions, measuring work ethic and intelligence for both 
blacks and whites, ranging from one to seven.  To construct the index, the difference between the 
score for blacks and the score for whites on each of the two questions is calculated, and then the 
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average of these two differences is calculated.  The resulting scores are mapped onto a 0-1 scale: 
“0” is the lowest possible value, in which Blacks are given the most positive response possible to 
both questions and Whites are given the most negative possible response to both questions, “0.5” 
is the neutral point, at which Whites and Blacks are rated equally on average across the two 
questions, and “1” is the highest possible value of prejudice, where Blacks are given the most 
negative response while Whites are given the most positive response.  
 It is also important to note a key potential limitation of the stereotype questions: the 
possibility that social desirability pressures influence self-reporting (Huddy and Feldman 2009).  
It is important to note, therefore, that all the following results are robust to using a standard racial 
resentment scale (e.g., Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012) in place of the stereotype index as the 
measure of prejudice.   
Environmental Policy Position Measures: We also seek to test whether, in the context of an 
ambiguous policy statement, candidate race influences respondents’ likelihood of projecting their 
own issue position onto the candidate.  To do so, we measured both the subjects’ position on the 
environment and subjects’ perceptions of the candidate’s position on the environment.  The 
subjects’ position was measured in the study’s first wave; the candidate’s perceived position was 
measured in the second wave, after the experimental manipulation.  This approach was taken to 
ensure respondents do not alter their own issue stance to match that of their preferred candidate.  
The measure used is a standard question from the American National Election Studies survey: a 
seven-point scale (recoded onto a 0-1 interval) ranging from “it is important to protect the 
environment even if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living” to 
“protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining jobs and our standard of living.”  
Results 
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Effects of Ambiguity on Candidate Evaluations 
 We have argued that a white candidate who uses ambiguous rhetoric will be evaluated 
more positively than an otherwise identical white candidate who does not use ambiguous 
rhetoric.  This beneficial effect of ambiguity, however, should not be present in a similar 
comparison for a black candidate.  To investigate this expectation in the context of our 
experiment, we present Figure 1, which plots the proportion of subjects who choose the 
Democratic candidate, Sam Larson, for each of the six possible treatments.  There are no 
statistically discernible differences between support for the white male candidate and support for 
the black male candidate in the Silent and Precise conditions, consistent with some previous 
research on the main effects of candidate race (e.g., Citrin, et al. 1990; Sigelman, et al. 1995; 
Weaver 2012).  In support of our expectations, however, the white candidate receives 
substantially more support than the black candidate does in the Ambiguous condition. 
 Indeed, in the Ambiguous condition, the white version of Larson receives almost 60% of 
the vote share among our subjects.  This is a larger vote share than in the two other treatments; it 
is also a statistically significant increase compared to the Silent condition.  A closer look at the 
data reveals that much of this effect is driven by Larson’s co-partisans.  That is, when Larson is 
white and ambiguous, the candidate does a better job of getting his fellow Democrats to say they 
will support him rather than refraining from voting.  In this condition, only 6.5% of Democrats 
say they prefer neither candidate compared to 18.8% in the other conditions. 
 The results change when Larson is black and ambiguous.  In the Ambiguous condition, 
support for the black version of Larson is 20 percentage points lower than for the white version 
of the otherwise identical candidate (p < 0.01).  It does not appear that subjects are punishing the 
black version of Larson for ambiguity on balance.  Rather, there are no statistically significant 
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effects across treatments in the Black condition, meaning that unlike the white version of Larson, 
the black version of Larson is not rewarded for ambiguity.  Notably, these results are similar to 
previous research that – using partisanship as the key group characteristic – shows that the in-
group candidate (in our case the white candidate, and in previous research the co-partisan 
candidate) receives a benefit from ambiguous position taking, while the out-group candidate is 
not punished (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009b).  This consistency across results is useful, as it 
suggests there is nothing anomalous about our sample or our treatments.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
A tougher test of our argument examines whether the effects of ambiguity are statistically 
distinguishable across the white male and black male candidates. We conduct this test through 
four regression analyses presented in Table 1.  The first two models report coefficients from 
logistic regression analyses, as the dependent variable is binary, coded “1” if the respondent 
prefers Larson and “0” otherwise.  The last two models are ordinary least squares regression 
analyses, as the dependent variable is continuous: a differential between warmth for Larson and 
warmth for McCann.  The models also vary with respect to the baseline (excluded) condition: in 
Models 1 and 3, the Silent condition is the baseline, whereas in Models 2 and 4, the Precise 
condition is the baseline.  
 The key quantity of interest is the regression coefficient on the interaction between 
ambiguity and candidate race (Black).  In all four models, this coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant.  This shows that regardless of whether the dependent variable is 
measured as vote choice or as a feeling thermometer differential, and regardless of whether the 
point of comparison is the Silent condition (in which the environment is not mentioned) or the 
Precise condition (in which the candidate takes a specific environmental policy stance), the 
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effects of ambiguity differ statistically between the white male candidate and the black male 
candidate.  Candidate race conditions the impact of ambiguous rhetoric about positions on the 
environment on voter evaluations of the candidate. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Effects of Ambiguity on Policy Projection  
The results so far have borne out our expectation that ambiguity is beneficial for white 
candidates but not for black candidates.  We now test the logic underlying this expectation: 
ambiguous rhetoric causes many voters to project their own policy positions onto white 
candidates, but the same is not true for black candidates. 
 The key comparison here is between the Silent and Ambiguous conditions.  In the Precise 
condition, the candidate’s position is made very clear, while in the remaining two conditions, the 
subject must guess what the candidate’s position on the issue is.  If the candidate uses ambiguous 
rhetoric, the subject may interpret the vague statement about the environment charitably, 
believing that the candidate shares the subject’s position—though, we suspect, only if the 
candidate is white. 
 We therefore model the subject’s placement of candidate Larson on the issue of the 
environment (measured in wave 2) as a function of Larson’s race, the ambiguity of Larson’s 
environmental rhetoric, and the subject’s own environmental position on the same scale 
(measured in wave 1).  For ease of interpretation, we plot marginal effects of ambiguity based on 
this regression analysis in Figure 2 (all other variables set to their means); the full set of 
coefficient estimates can be found in Web Appendix 4.  
We begin with the condition in which the candidate is white; as Figure 2a shows, the 
effects of ambiguous rhetoric depend on the respondent’s own policy position.  Consistent with 
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expectations, among those respondents who are liberal on the environment, assignment to the 
Ambiguous condition is associated with a liberal rating of Larson’s policy position. Among those 
respondents who are conservative on the environment, meanwhile, assignment to the Ambiguous 
condition is associated with a conservative rating of Larson’s policy position.  Critically, the 
slope of the line is statistically distinguishable from zero,7 indicating that the effects of ambiguity 
on perceptions of the candidate’s position differ statistically depending on the respondent’s own 
position.  For the white male candidate, in sum, ambiguous rhetoric increases the association 
between the subject’s stance on the environment and the subject’s estimate of the candidate’s 
stance.  Ambiguous rhetoric leads to policy projection. 
However, as predicted, these effects once again do not extend to the black male 
candidate.  Figure 2b reveals that when the candidate is black, the effects of ambiguity are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero across the range of the respondent’s own position on the 
environment.  For the black male candidate, unlike the white male candidate, the use of 
ambiguous rhetoric does not increase congruence between the respondent’s environmental policy 
position and the respondent’s perception of the candidate’s position.  Furthermore, the effect of 
ambiguity on perceived congruence actually differs statistically across candidate racial categories 
(Web Appendix 4).  These findings present further evidence that candidate race conditions the 
effects of ambiguous rhetoric.8 
																																								 																				
7 See Web Appendix 4: the relevant coefficient is for the interaction between “R Conservative on 
Environment” and “Ambiguous.” 
8 An implication of our theory is that projection mediates the relationship between rhetorical 
ambiguity and support for the white candidate (because they enjoy the benefit of the doubt), but 
that no such mediational relationship exists for black candidates (because they do not). We test 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
Ambiguity and the Activation of Racial Prejudice 
 Our final theoretic expectation examines racial prejudice, a critical source of individual-
level heterogeneity that may condition voter responses to black candidates’ ambiguity.  We have 
argued that for black candidates, the use of ambiguous rhetoric has the potential to activate racial 
prejudice, increasing its effects on candidate evaluations.  Hence, we should observe that among 
racially prejudiced voters, a black male candidate who uses ambiguous rhetoric will actually be 
viewed more negatively than a black male candidate who does not rely on this type of rhetoric.	
 To assess this expectation, we conduct regression analyses similar to those in Table 1 
except that racial prejudice is included as a moderator of the effects.  We note first that the 
distribution of the racial prejudice variable, presented in Web Appendix 5, is similar to its 
distribution in other national samples (e.g., Piston 2010).  Next, the appropriate test for the 
hypothesis that candidate race and ambiguity jointly activate racial prejudice is a statistical 
significance test on the coefficient of an interaction among three variables: candidate race, 
ambiguous rhetoric, and racial prejudice.  This approach also necessitates controlling for 
potential confounds – variables plausibly correlated with both racial prejudice and candidate 
choice – including partisanship, ideology, and demographics: gender, race, education, and 
income.  Furthermore, we also control for the interaction between partisanship, candidate race, 
and ambiguous rhetoric, in order to rule out the possibility that any differential in responses to 
experimental condition by prejudice is actually reflective of a differential in responses to 
experimental condition by partisanship.  Notably, the findings do not change meaningfully if 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
this proposition and find, as expected, evidence of such a mediational effect when it comes to the 
white candidate in our study, but none for the black candidate (Web Appendix 8). 
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these control variables are excluded.  Due to space constraints, the results are presented in Web 
Appendix 6.  Analyses using racial resentment instead of stereotypes as the measure of prejudice 
yield similar results (see Web Appendix 7). 
 Importantly and consistent with expectations, in all four models the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction term is negative and statistically significant.  This suggests that racial 
prejudice is uniquely associated with unfavorable evaluations of the candidate when the 
candidate is black and uses ambiguous rhetoric.  This finding holds regardless of whether the 
dependent variable is candidate choice (Models 1 and 2) or warmth toward candidate Larson 
relative to his opponent (Models 3 and 4); it also holds regardless of whether the point of 
comparison is the Silent condition (in which the environment is not mentioned) or the point of 
comparison is the Precise condition (in which the candidate’s stance is clear).  
 Given that some of the models use logistic regressions, it is difficult to determine the 
magnitude of the effect based on the coefficients alone.  Figure 3, therefore, plots the marginal 
effect of ambiguous rhetoric in conditions in which Larson is black; Figure 3a presents the effect 
of ambiguity relative to the Silent condition and Figure 3b presents the effect of ambiguity 
relative to the Precise condition.  These marginal effects are plotted across values of the measure 
of prejudice – the stereotype index – ranging from the neutral point of 0.5 to the extreme 
prejudice point of 1; all other variables are set to their means. 
 Among those scoring at the neutral point, in which no prejudice is reported, the marginal 
effect of ambiguity is slightly positive, although statistically indistinguishable from zero.  As 
prejudice increases, however, the effects of ambiguity trend downward.  Subjects high in racial 
prejudice actually punish the black candidate for ambiguity, regardless of whether the 
comparison is a precise environmental statement or no environmental statement at all.  
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How is the result in Figure 3 consistent with the result in Figure 1, which showed the 
black candidate was not punished on balance?  At the neutral point on the stereotype index, 
where most subjects are located (see Web Appendix 5 for the distribution of prejudice), both 
candidates are receiving a small positive boost from ambiguity, offsetting the punishment the 
black candidate receives from those subjects who are highly prejudiced.9  These results suggest 
that ambiguous rhetoric provides fertile grounds for the activation of racial prejudice in elections 
with black candidates.  That is, for a black candidate facing racially prejudiced voters, the use of 
ambiguous rhetoric actually backfires, resulting in decreased support for the candidate. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Replication Study 
 To ensure that our findings extend beyond one study conducted at a single point in time, 
we conducted a replication of our initial analysis.  This replication took place nearly two years 
after our initial study, using a different sample of adults  – the types of changes in experimental 
procedure that can reinforce the external validity of the findings (McDermott 2011).  
Specifically, while our initial study relies on SSI, the replication study uses YouGov, a survey 
company that employs somewhat different recruitment and fielding techniques than SSI.  
Although the general structure of the study process remains similar, the replication study makes 
some key changes to measurement.  Most importantly, however, following McDermott’s (2011) 
																																								 																				
9 We now return to the additional possible mechanism that white voters have more rigid 
expectations for the ideological orientations for black candidates, which make ambiguity less 
effective. We consider this mechanism using tests of distributional differences in placement of 
the candidates (Web Appendix 9). These tests suggest no differences in distributions by race.  
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suggestion for replication in different contexts, this study is conducted during the 2016 
Presidential campaign – a context that is markedly different than the original study.10  
Despite the changes in context and sample, the results of this replication reinforce the 
patterns of findings presented in our main study.  Just as our main study demonstrates, across 
both types of dependent variables (thermometer and vote choice), support for the white male 
candidate is greater in the Ambiguous condition than in the Precise condition in the context of 
environmental policy, again following previous research on the benefits of ambiguous position-
taking.  In contrast, just as we observe in our main study, the black male candidate does not 
receive any benefit from relying on ambiguous rhetoric, again across both our vote choice and 
thermometer measures.  Comparing the candidates directly, the beneficial effects of ambiguity 
are statistically discernable only for the white male candidate; this is most apparent in the 
thermometer measure.  
Next, much as we do in our first study, we consider whether racial attitudes affect 
individual responses to ambiguity.  Our replication reinforces the observed patterns. Among low-
prejudiced white respondents, the black candidate receives a small, statistically insignificant 
boost in support in the Ambiguous condition, but among white respondents who score high on 
																																								 																				
10 The YouGov replication has a smaller sample than the original study (N = 398 non-Hispanic 
white adult U.S. citizens, characteristics in Web Appendix 3), and therefore it only has four 
experimental conditions: Precise White, Precise Black, Ambiguous White, and Ambiguous Black.  
In our view, the Precise condition is a better control than Silence, as a clear issue position leaves 
no room for the projection of one’s views onto the candidate (Milita, et al. 2014).  In contrast, if 
a candidate remains silent on an issue, voters may either presume that the candidate’s silence 
simply means he or she holds the position of the national party (Milita, et al. 2017).   
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prejudice, the black male candidate incurs a penalty for being ambiguous (p < 0.03).  We present 
the results of the replication analysis in Web Appendix 10.  
Conclusion 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that for candidates and parties looking to maximize vote 
shares, ambiguous rhetoric is appealing because, "if [they] can successfully convince different 
groups of voters that they are ideologically close to them, they can win the hearts and minds of a 
broader electorate" (Somer-Topcu 2015, 852).  Candidates can use ambiguous rhetoric to defuse 
attacks from opponents (Alesina and Cukierman 1990), manage their uncertainty about voters’ 
issue positions (Erikson and Romero 1990), appeal to a wide range of voters (Aldrich 1995), and 
provide themselves with wiggle room for post-election position change (Tavits 2007).   
 Our research, however, suggests that ambiguity is not an effective strategy for black 
candidates competing for the votes of non-black citizens.  In survey experiments, we manipulate 
both candidate race and ambiguity in a fictitious election between two males.  We find that when 
the candidate is a white male, the candidate reaps a benefit from pursuing a strategy of ambiguity 
in his statements about the environment.  When the candidate is a black male, however, there is 
no such benefit.  Consistent with previous research, we find white respondents are more likely to 
project the candidate’s position onto their own when the candidate is white, but not when the 
candidate is black.  Finally, among racially prejudiced subjects, support for the black male 
candidate actually decreases when he makes an ambiguous statement.  These results are robust 
to multiple measures of candidate preference and multiple measures of racial prejudice. 
 These findings build on scholarship identifying conditions limiting the effectiveness of 
ambiguity (Shepsle 1972; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009b).  Given that the effectiveness of 
ambiguity is variable, we suspect that black candidates may do well to consider the composition 
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of a district when deciding whether to go ambiguous; our findings suggest that the larger the 
share of racially prejudiced individuals there are in a district, the more dangerous the strategy of 
ambiguity is for a black candidate, even if that district is made up largely of co-partisans. 
 The findings also contribute to scholarship examining the causes of continued black 
electoral underrepresentation in the 21st century, and in particular the role played by voter 
responses to black candidates. While many studies on this topic have found evidence of 
discrimination against black candidates, others have not (Citrin et al. 1990; Highton 2004; Kam 
and Kinder 2012; Sigelman et al. 1995; Tesler and Sears 2010; Terkildsen 1993; Voss and 
Lublin 2001). These mixed findings have led scholars to search for conditions under which 
voters discriminate against black candidates (Hutchings and Piston 2011). We identify one such 
condition – the presence of ambiguous rhetoric. This finding supports the conclusion that voter 
reactions to black candidates do not occur in isolation but are conditional on the context of a 
campaign (n.b., Berinsky, et al. 2011; Krupnikov and Piston 2015a). The impact of candidate 
race on voting behavior, therefore, is highly dependent on electoral strategy. 
 While here we focus on black male candidates, our studies set a foundation for future 
research that further explores the extent to which candidate characteristics shape the 
effectiveness of a candidate’s rhetorical strategy. Future research, for example, might do well to 
consider whether the results, which were obtained from a sample of non-black survey 
respondents, would differ for candidates attempting to appeal to black voters (Lerman, McCabe, 
and Sadin 2015). Moreover, research can also look beyond black male candidates. White voters 
who view Latino candidates or Asian American candidates negatively (McConnaughy, et al. 
2010; Visalvanich forthcoming) might also be unlikely to give these candidates the benefit of the 
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doubt upon encountering ambiguous rhetoric, again suggesting that ambiguity may be less 
beneficial than existing research, which largely ignores candidate race, would suggest. 
Finally, although we focus on black male candidates, a literature on the intersection of 
race and gender suggests that these could play a joint role in responses to candidate rhetoric 
(Philpot and Walton 2007). Research on the electoral fates of black women suggests that in 
certain electoral contexts black women candidates may be more likely to be successful than 
black men (Smooth 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2015); in other electoral contexts, however, black 
women may face even greater barriers to victory than black men (Michener et al. 2012). In our 
view, these findings further underscore the importance of studying the effects of rhetoric in 
conjunction with candidate characteristics. 
 Beyond the important topic of ambiguous rhetoric, this project takes a critical step by 
connecting two larger strands of scholarship that often operate in isolation: the effects of 
candidate decisions on the campaign trail and the effects of candidate attributes. Proposals to 
increase taxes on the wealthiest Americans may be interpreted differently if they are made by 
candidates who are known to be exceptionally wealthy. Anti-abortion statements may mean 
something different to voters when they are made by a male candidate than when they are made 
by a female candidate. The impact of political elites’ strategic electoral decisions cannot be 
separated from the characteristics of elites themselves. Our understanding of campaign effects 
depends on our ability to examine these two sets of factors simultaneously. 
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Table 1. The Joint Effects of Race and Ambiguous Rhetoric on Candidate Support 
 
 
(1) 
Pr(Vote 
Larson) 
 
(2) 
Pr(Vote 
Larson) 
 
(3) 
Larson/ 
McCann 
Warmth Diff. 
(4) 
Larson/ 
McCann 
Warmth Diff. 
Black 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06* 
 
(0.34) (0.31) (0.03) (0.03) 
Precise 0.23 -- 0.03 -- 
 
(0.31) -- (0.03) -- 
Black * Precise -0.07 -- 0.02 -- 
 
(0.46) -- (0.05) -- 
Silent -- -0.23 -- -0.03 
 
-- (0.31) -- (0.03) 
Black * Silent -- 0.07 -- -0.02 
 
-- (0.46) -- (0.05) 
Ambiguous 0.76** 0.53* 0.09** 0.05* 
 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.03) (0.03) 
Black * Ambiguous -0.86* -0.80* -0.08* -0.10* 
 
(0.45) (0.43) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -0.37* -0.14 0.47*** 0.50*** 
 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) 
N 498 498 483 483 
Log-likelihood/R-sq. -339.42 -339.42 0.03 0.03 
 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (one-tailed); cell entries are regression coefficients (standard 
errors in parentheses). Models 1 and 2 are logistic regressions, as the dependent variable is coded 
“1” if the respondent prefers candidate Larson and “0” otherwise. Models 3 and 4 are ordinary 
least squares regressions, as the dependent variable is warmth toward candidate Larson (0-100, 
higher values indicate more warmth) minus warmth toward candidate McCann, and the resulting 
scale is transformed onto a 0-1 interval. “Black” indicates the experimental condition in which 
candidate Larson is black; he is white in the excluded condition. In models 1 and 3, the Silent 
Condition is the excluded condition; in models 2 and 4, the Precise Condition is the excluded 
condition.  
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Figure 1. Support for Candidate Larson Across Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
Lighter bars represent conditions in which Larson is white; darker bars represent conditions in which 
Larson is black. For the “Control” condition, Larson is “Silent” and makes no statement about the 
environment. “Precise” refers to conditions in which Larson takes a specific environmental policy 
position, and “Ambiguity” refers to conditions in which Larson makes a vague reference to the 
environment without any policy content. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. T-statistics are 
for difference of proportions between support for the white candidate and support for the black 
candidate, broken out by the Silent, Precise, and Ambiguity conditions. 
 
 
34 
Figure 2. Effect of Ambiguous Rhetoric on Respondent Perceptions of Candidate’s Position 
 
2a. Candidate is White 
 
B. Candidate is Black 
 
For the white candidate, but not the black candidate, ambiguous rhetoric increases the association 
between the respondent’s own environmental position and the respondent’s reporting of the candidate’s 
position. Estimates from model in Web Appendix 4. Shaded area shows 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Ambiguous Rhetoric on Support for Black Candidates, by Prejudice 
 
3a. Relative to Silent Condition 
 
 
 
3b. Relative to Precise Condition 
 
Among racially prejudiced voters, the black candidate is viewed less favorably in the condition in which 
he uses ambiguous rhetoric than in the other conditions. Estimates from model in Web Appendix 6. 
Shaded area shows 90% confidence interval. 
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